Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservativism by Michelman, Frank Isaac
 




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservativism, 35 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 301 (1993).
Published Version http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/11/
Accessed February 16, 2015 4:58:04 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12933371
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAWilliam & Mary Law Review
Volume 35|Issue 1 Article 11
Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservativism
Frank I. Michelman
Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Frank I. Michelman,Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial
Conservativism, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301 (1993), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol35/
iss1/11ARTICLES
PROPERTY, FEDERALISM,  AND JURISPRUDENCE:  A
COMMENT  ON LUCAS AND  JUDICIAL  CONSERVATISM
FRANK  I. MICHELMAN*
I
Professor Robin West has  explained in a helpful way what peo-
ple generally have in mind when speaking in the United States to-
day of judicial conservatism.1  A given judge's work, West says, can
be  any  or  all of three  kinds  of conservative:  market,  social,  and
legal.2  Market-conservative  judicial  work,  paraphrasing  West, fa-
vors institutions  and practices designed to reward competitive  suc-
cess and preserve to the successful the fruits of their success.'  So-
cial-conservative judicial  work uses  law's  authority to sustain the
social  dominance  of established  mainstream  conventional  morali-
ties  and  cultural  forms.4 Legal-conservative  judicial  work  locates
authority  in  an  already-given  law,  absolving  the judicial  office  of
creative  and critical  responsibility.5
Certainly  a  given  judge's  work  may rank  high  on  any  one  of
these  three  judicial-conservative  dimensions, regardless  of how it
registers  on the others. What  of the converse?  Can high scores  on
all three dimensions, en bloc, possibly frame the work of any single
judge?  If so,  then  that judge  is  a  judicial-conservative  paragon.
* Robert Walmsly University Professor, Harvard Law School. A version of this Essay was
delivered  as the  James  Gould  Cutler Lecture  on  April,  12,  1993,  at the  Marshall-Wythe
School of Law on the occasion of the celebration of the Tercentenary  of the College of Wil-
liam  and  Mary.  Several  friends  and  colleagues  contributed  helpful  suggestions.  Special
thanks to Richard Fallon for thoughtful  comments on two earlier drafts.
1. See Robin  West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism,  88  MICH.  L. REv.
641,  651-62  (1990).
2. Id. at 654-58.
3. Id. at 657-58.
4. Id. at 654-55.
5.  Id. at 655-57.WILLIAM  AND  MARY  LAW  REVIEW
The country's leading candidate at the moment for this accolade is
Justice  Antonin  Scalia."
One  question  I  raise  here  is  whether  such  conservative  all-
roundedness is possible. The meaning of that question, I grant you,
may not be perfectly clear. After all, there sit our judicial conserva-
tives. Can there be any question about their possibility9  No, surely
not; but there  may still be a question  about whether  they are  al-
ways, at every  moment, quite everything they  would seem.
II
Perhaps  one  pictures  current  American  judicial  conservatives
pursuing certain  programmatic  aims,  trying to steer in certain  di-
rections  the present  and future  course  of American  constitutional
law  Two such putative judicial-conservative  projects will be on the
table here.  One  we  can call  the property  project  (or, occasionally,
the regulatory-taking  project).  It alms  at bolstering  national  con-
stitutional protections for private property holdings against loss  of
value  to onerous state regulations.
Another  ongoing judicial-conservative  project  is one  we  can call
by the name  Justice  Black  once  fastened  on  it:  Our  Federalism.8
"Our  Federalism"  names  a certain  disposition  on the part of fed-
6.  Chief Justice William  Rehnquist has certainly also earned honorable  mention, and the
early signs are  promising  for Justice  Clarence  Thomas.  For  signs of Justice  Scalia's  social
conservatism,  consider his opinions in Planned  Parenthood  v. Casey,  112 S. Ct. 2791,  2873
(1992)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  the judgment  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part);  Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292  (1990)  (Scalia, J., concurring); and Michael H. v.
Gerald D.,  491 U.S.  110  (1989).  For signs of legal  conservatism,  consider, in addition to the
foregoing opinions, Employment  Div. v. Smith,  494 U.S.  872  (1990)  (Scalia, J.),  along  with
Justice Scalia's  extra-judicial  encomia to  "originalism"  and to "the rule  of law as  a law  of
rules."  See  Antonin  Scalia,  Orignalism: The Lesser Evil, 57  U.  CIN.  L.  REV.  849  (1989);
Antonin Scalia,  The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.  1175 (1989).  For signs
of market  conservatism,  consider  Justice  Scalia's  opinions  in  City  of Richmond  v.  J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S.  469, 520 (1989)  (Scalia, J.,  concurring in the judgment); Pennell V. City
of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15  (1988)  (Scalia, J., concurring  in part and dissenting in part); and
Nollan v.  California  Coastal Comm'n,  483  U.S. 825  (1987).
7.  See  Lucas  v. South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  112  S.  Ct.  2886  (1992);  First  English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel  v. Irving,
481 U.S.  704 (1987); Nollan, 483 U.S.  825; see also Richard J.  Lazarus, Putting the Correct
"Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN.  L. REV.  1411,  1413-15  (1993)  (discussing the emergence  of a con-
servative judiciary during the Reagan and Bush Administrations,  and "the Taking Clause's
new  found prominence  on the conservative  agenda").
8. See  Younger  v. Harris,  401  U.S.  37, 44  (1971).
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eral judges regarding their dealings with state law and state courts.
It encompasses  three related  concerns:  (i) a concern  to keep  clear
the demarcations  between  federal  law and state law,  and between
federal and state adjudicative provinces;  (ii)  a concern to maintain
within the federal judiciary a deportment of respect for the compe-
tence  and responsibility  of the  state judiciaries;  and  (iii)  a more
general concern  to maintain within the federal judiciary  a posture
of judicial restraint.
The  judicial-conservative  property  project  obviously  sounds  in
"market"  conservatism.  Our  Federalism's  deflection  of authority
from federal courts can be for federal judges a form of "legal"  con-
servatism.9  A part of my thesis is that between these two judicial-
conservative  projects-the  property  (or regulatory-taking)  project
and  Our Federalism-there  is  a  bad  fit. Indeed, it has yet  to be
shown  that the two can be  held together  convincingly
You might fairly ask what news there  is supposed to be in that.
It's  an  old  story,  after  all,  that  Reconstruction  inscribed  into
American  constitutionalism  a rather  sharp break  (of emphasis, at
least)  between  an older  federalistic  regard  for the jurisprudential
severalty  and semi-sovereignty  of the States  and  a newer  liberal-
universalist regard for basic human rights to be guaranteed  by na-
tional power  against  state neglect  or oppression.  A  modern  para-
digm is the Warren Court pruning  back federalism in  the field  of
race.10  When judges  mount  the bench  for  whom  property  figures
strongly  as a basic  human interest and constitutional  concern,  we
can expect to find them similarly clearing out spaces in Our Feder-
alism for national enforcement  of property rights. The story in its
broad outline is not new. My hope in these pages  is to enrich it in
detail and nuance.
Warren Court judicial liberals not only made federalism yield to
civil rights. Under the constitutional banner of "liberty,"  they na-
9.  See, e.g., Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experi-
ence, 19  GA. L. REv. 999,  1002-03  (1985)  (referring to the "decision-ducking"  aspect of vari-
ous  sub-practices  of judicial  federalism,  such as certification  and abstention).
10.  See, e.g.,  Katzenbach  v. Morgan, 384  U.S.  641  (1966);  Katzenbach  v.  McClung,  379
U.S.  294  (1964);  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.  1  (1958);  cf.  Boynton v. Virginia,  364 U.S.  454,
457-60  (1960)  (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act's prohibition  on racial discrimma-
tion  in  transportation  services  extends  to  independent  businesses  located  in  transit
terminals).
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tionalized portions of the law regarding those dimensions of liberty
picked  out  by  terms  such  as  "privacy"  and  "autonomy,"'1  thus
producing new legal protections for certain aspects  of personal lib-
erty  Might we  not, then, expect  present-day judicial conservatives
to make similar use of the Constitution's  "property"  clauses to na-
tionalize  some aspects  of the law of property'12  From these reflec-
tions  sprung  the  bright  idea  that first  prompted  this  Essay- the
idea  that such a  conservative  "property"  project  would be harder
to bring off than the liberal "liberty" project, by reason of a certain
deep discrepancy in the ways in which lawyers  conceive of property
and liberty,  respectively
Liberty, I thought, lends  itself readily to judicial nationalization
because  "liberty"  is, for lawyers, intuitively a category  whose scope
and content are known independently  of current legal facts. When
it  comes to knowing  what liberty  is, it  doesn't matter  at all what
the  extant  laws  of one  State  or  another  say about  it.  Liberty  is
what it  is, regardless  of what  the laws  say  If  the  laws  are  not in
accord  with  liberty, then  liberty  can  stand  while  the  laws  fall.'
3
Liberty thus  understood  is  what we  may  loosely  call  a naturalis-
tic-as  opposed  to  a  positivistic-normative  category  I  say
"loosely"  because to assert that a category's content  is determined
without reference  to current legal facts  is not necessarily to make
that content a matter of transcendent reason beyond all contingen-
cies  of human  action;  it  does  not,  for  example,  necessarily  deny
that the  content  of constitutional  "liberty"  is  in  some  part  con-
trolled  by past social and political  facts. A judge  who tested  cur-
rent  laws  against  a  "traditional"  conception  of constitutional  lib-
erty, firmly  set  in  a  social  past, would  still  be  treating  "liberty"
11.  See  Stanley  v.  Georgia,  394  U.S.  557  (1969);  Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U.S.  479
(1965);  Louis  Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,  74 CoLum.  L. REV.  1410  (1974).
12.  See supra note  7 and accompanying  text.
13.  An opposite approach  is  not unthinkable. Justices now sitting have  opined  that "lib-
erty" interests subject to procedural due process  protection are those that either are specifi-
cally named  in the Bill  of Rights  or, alternatively, "attain  constitutional status by vir-
tue of the fact that they have been initially recognized  and protected by state law."  Paul v.
Davis,  424  U.S.  693,  710  (1976)  (Rehnquist, J.).  See  David  L. Shapiro, Mr  Justice Rehn-
quist: A  Preliminary View,  90  HARv.  L.  REv. 293,  324-28  (1976)  (analyzing  and  criticizing
Justice  Rehnquist's reasoning  in the Paul decision).
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naturalistically  in our special sense  of severing the category's  con-
tent from the dictates of current law.14
Property, I thought, figures differently-non-naturalistically-in
contemporary  American  legal  thought.  By  an  argument  that
reaches  back  at  least  to  Bentham,15  property's  scope  and  con-
tent-property's  existence,  even-are  completely  dependent  upon
standing law. Thus, m contrast with liberty, property cannot stand
while the laws fall. My property is that to which the laws currently
in force  give me a secured entitlement.  In  a vacuum  of such laws,
there can  be no property 16
This is  what is widely called a legal-positivist  view of property
From it (when we take it fully seriously) flow some interesting con-
sequences.  First, the term  "property"  in the Fourteenth  Amend-
ment denotes nothing except  what some  corpus  of extant positive
law happens to make into property  Second, the Federal Constitu-
tion  does  not  itself  contain  the  requisite  corpus  of positive  law.
Third, the constitutional  term  "property,"  therefore,  can  denote
nothing except  what some  extra-constitutional  cadre  or  cadres  of
positive  lawmakers  from  time to time  may happen  to  make  into
property  Fourth, these  cadres  can  be  none  other  than  the duly
authorized  lawmakers  of the several States-their respective  legis-
latures and common law judiciaries. If  one grants the foregoing  ar-
gument  (as  the  legal-positivist  view  of constitutional  "property"
apparently  requires),  then  it  follows  logically  that  effective  na-
tional  judicial  protection  for  property  must mean  giving  federal
judges the last word on questions of the meanings  of laws emanat-
ing from state authorities. But this seems to be a gross contraven-
tion  of Our  Federalism.
The general problem here is easy to identify  It  arises out of the
fact that certain clauses in the Federal Constitution, while plainly
14.  May not  such an  approach also  claim to be "positivist"  in the sense of judicial self-
abnegation  emphasized by Robert Cover, according to which the judge's role  is to apply "the
will of others"  and "in no event" to exercise  a "personal will of the judge?"  See  ROBERT M.
COVER,  JUSTICE ACCUSED:  ANTISLAVERY  AND  THE  JUDICIAL  PROCESS  132 (1975).  Such a claim
must rest on an unspoken,  problematic premise:  that "tradition"  supplies,  in  a way  or de-
gree  that "natural  reason"  does  not, a  normative source  that is clearly  distinct from  any
personal  "will"  of the judge.  See infra notes  61-69  and accompanying text.
15.  JEREMY  BENTHAM,  THE THEORY  OF  LEGISLATION  68-69  (R. Hildreth trans.,  1975).
16.  For further explanation, see  infra pp. 308-11,  313-14.
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designed to guarantee  certain classes of individual interests against
oppressive  state  lawmaking,  speak  in terms of general-law  catego-
ries,  such  as  contract  and  property,  whose  delineation  generally
has been  thought to fall within the reserved province of state law-
making,  beyond  the  national  government's  delegated  lawmaking
powers. 1 7  Again,  the  problem  is  anything  but  new  The  concern
that state courts might defeat federal constitutional claims by eva-
sive  manipulation  of the  state  general-law  categories  was  present
at the creation  of federal judicial review  of state  court decisions"
and has been recurrent  ever  since.'9
Within  the  sweep  of this  history, there  might  be nothing  unto-
ward about the property project of contemporary judicial conserva-
tives.  It  might  be a  normal case-a  resurgence  of federal  judicial
resolve to vindicate  against state legal machination a national  con-
stitutional norm of regard for a specified  class of individual  rights.
That  is  doubtless  how  it would  seem,  if  the  participant  federal
judges had produced  a convincing naturalistic account  of constitu-
tional "property"  upon which to take their stand. So far, however,
they  have  not. Until  they  do,  the  question  will  remain  of how  a
joint commitment  to both  Our  Federalism  and nationally guaran-
teed  property rights can possibly  be held together  coherently with
the prevailing  legal-positivist account of constitutional  "property"
The lesson here is not exactly what I had thought starting out; it
is not that judicial  nationalization  of property  rights  is  harder  to
square  with Our  Federalism  than judicial  nationalization  of  per-
sonal-liberty rights, because  property but not liberty is deeply un-
derstood  by  lawyers  to  be  a  totally  law-dependent  concept.  The
17.  This view of general-law provinciality  gained its most emphatic form in Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64  (1938),  but it has prevailed throughout  our constitutional history.
Even  under the doctrine of Swift  v.  Tyson, the common  law spontaneously  applied  by fed-
eral  courts  in  diversity-of-citizenship  cases  was  held  subordinate  to state  legislation.  See
Swift v. Tyson,  41 U.S.  (16 Pet.)  1 (1842),  overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.  64
(1938).
18.  See Fairfax's  Devisee  v. Hunter's Lessee,  11  U.S.  (7  Cranch)  603  (1813)  (determining
the correct  application  of Virginia  law to a  land-title  dispute  affected  by federal  treaties);
see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,  14 U.S.  (1  Wheat.)  304  (1816)  (reversing Virginia Court
of Appeals'  refusal to  follow the Supreme  Court's mandate  in Fairfax's Devisee).
19.  See, e.g.,  Webb's  Fabulous  Pharmacies,  Inc.  v.  Beckwith,  449  U.S.  155,  164  (1980);
Hughes  v.  Washington,  389  U.S.  290,  296-97  (1967)  (Stewart, J.,  concurring);  Demorest v.
City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944); Indiana  ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303
U.S.  95,  98-99  (1938).
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truth, I think, is more interesting. Undoubtedly, we in our lifetimes
have  witnessed  and  experienced  the  conjunction  of a  positivistic
inflection  of "property"  with a naturalistic  inflection  of "liberty"
This development, however, is no manifestation  of anything stably
fixed in the concepts  of property  and liberty  It  is a manifestation,
rather, of constitutional  politics.
"Property,"  after all, had a strong naturalistic  force  in American
constitutional  argument  in the Lochner era,20  and  in  the  Gilded
Age  before  that. 2'  Positivization  of "property"  (the constitutional
category)  is  a  more  recent  occurrence,  the  work  of the  counter-
Lochner New  Deal  and  Warren  Courts.  The  Warren  Court,  of
course,  also  infused  a  liberal  natural-law  content  into  "liberty"
(the constitutional  category).22
As a rough  generalization,  then: Nationalizers  naturalize;  feder-
alizers  positivize. Nationalizers  pour naturalistic  content into  con-
stitutional  categories  of  legally  protected  interests  and  rights;
federalizers  drain them of it.23  That much seems constant. What is
plainly not constant is  which  constitutional  categories  are at any
given time undergoing naturation  or denaturation. In a nice exam-
ple  of what J.M. Balkin  calls  "ideological  drift,"24 today's judicial
conservatives  work  at reversing,  in this respect,  certain  efforts  of
their  predecessors.  Determined  to  nationalize  a  general  law  of
property, today's judicial conservatives show signs of renaturalizing
constitutional "property  ",25
20.  See,  e.g.,  Truax  v.  Corrigan,  257  U.S.  312  (1921);  Coppage  v. Kansas,  236  U.S.  1
(1915);  Lochner v. New York,  198 U.S.  45  (1904).
21.  See  William  E. Forbath,  The  Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and Law  in  the
Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767; Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding
of Legal Consciousness:  The Case of Classical  Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in  3
RESEARCH  IN  LAW  AND  SOCIOLOGY  3  (Rita  J.  Simon  & Steven  Spitzer eds.,  1980).
22.  See Frank  I. Michelman,  Super Liberal: Romance,  Community, and Tradition in
William J.  Brennan, Jr's Constitutional  Thought, 77  VA.  L. REV.  1261,  1315-20  &  n.261
(1991).
23.  See LeBel, supra note 9, at 1023  ("[T]he suggestion that [geographical]  subdivisions
reflect different concepts  of morality seems  startlingly inappropriate  to the political  ethos
accepted  in  this country.  [T]he American  Civil  War seemingly  laid to rest the  ideal
that [different  notions  of right  and wrong]  would  be  officially  implemented  according  to
geographic location.").
24.  See J.M.  Balkin, Some  Realism About Pluralism:  Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment,  1990 DuKE L.J. 375,  375.
25,  More fully described, the situation is somewhat complex. Roughly speaking, conserva-
tives favor protection for the "old" property of private-sector  tangible wealth (along with its
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III
Clauses  in the Fifth and Fourteenth  Amendments  command,  in
effect, that governments  in this country shall pay for any property
they may take from private owners.26 By settled usage, we call this
constitutional  command  the  Taking  Clause.  By  settled  under-
standing, we place beyond the reach  of this command certain clas-
ses of government actions that do in fact deprive someone of a val-
ued mode  of enjoying or  exploiting property  One  such  exception
especially  concerns us  here:  According  to the prevalent legal-posi-
tivist view  of property, no taking of property, in the  constitutional
sense,  can  occur  unless  a  government  does  something  to  upset  a
property-based  advantage  that is just then  legally  secured  to the
private  owner,  by law then in  force.
Not  every  existent  and  substantial  property-based  advantage
meets this  test. Consider this  case:27  My home, let's say, sits on  a
parcel of land that I  own in fee simple absolute,  as fully as anyone
legally  can  own  a parcel  of land. Adjacent to my land  is a vacant
lot  owned  by the  city  Over  a  span  of many  years,  the  city  has
allowed  me  to  keep  a  vegetable  garden  on  the vacant  lot that  it
owns. The  city has graciously  granted  me, for free, what property
lawyers would call a revocable  license  for a garden. As a result, the
land parcel containing my home-the parcel that I unquestionably
own as my property-has yielded more  value to me over the years
than it otherwise  would  have  done.
intangible paper signifiers),  while liberals want protection for the "new"  property  of govern-
ment "benefits."  In its fully unfolded form,  then, the contemporary  conservative  movement
would be toward  renaturalizing  (and  concomitantly protecting)  old property, see infra text
accompanying  notes  56-59,  while  ultra-positivizing  (and  concomitantly  unprotecting)  new
property. See Cleveland  Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,  559 (1985)  (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting);  Arnett  v.  Kennedy,  416  U.S.  134  (1974)  (Rehnquist, J.,  plurality);  Shapiro,
supra note  13, at 322-24.  Partial positivization  (leaving to "nature"  the question  of basic
procedural  fairness  in administration)  was  the only  way to make government  benefits into
protected  property at all, and judicial  liberals  were  responsible for that development.  See
Goldberg v.  Kelly,  397 U.S.  254  (1970)  (Brennan,  J.).
26.  See U.S.  CONST. amend.  V ("nor shall private property be taken for public  use, with-
out just  compensation");  id. amend.  XIV,  § 1 ("No  State shall  deprive  any person  of
property, without due process  of law.  ");  Chicago,  B. & Q.R.R.  v. City  of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226  (1897)  (holding uncompensated  takings to be deprivations  of property without
due process  of law).
27.  For  a  graphic  example  in the  annals  of jurisprudence,  see United  States  v.  Willow
River  Power  Co.,  324  U.S.  499  (1945).
[Vol. 35:301JUDICIAL  CONSERVATISM
This  year,  however,  the  city calls  off the  deal and  revokes  the
license.  They  do  so,  they  say,  because  they  want  to  provide  a
habitat  for  owls  and  owls  don't  like  gardeners.  Having  the  owls
around is supposed to be a public benefit. If so, then I as a member
of the public share in that benefit. It's not, however, any more of a
benefit to me than to anyone  else. The  Supreme  Court has  often
said that a purpose  of the Taking  Clause  is  "to bar  Government
from forcing some  people alone to bear  burdens  which, in  all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. '2 8  It
may look, then, as though the Taking Clause must require the city
to compensate  me  for  my  special  loss  of the  gardening  privilege.
After all, I have  been stripped of a property-based  advantage  that
was real  and substantial while it lasted.
Settled doctrine, however, says the city doesn't owe me anything.
Settled  doctrine  says that because  no secure  prospect  of keeping
the gardening  privilege indefinitely  was  ever contained  within  my
legally recogmzed property entitlement, the revocation  of the privi-
lege by the city doesn't count  in the Constitution's  sight as  a real
loss of property  Real losses of property  occur only when  someone
is stripped of some property-based advantage that they've been led
by the law to count  upon as  really theirs to keep.29
Right or wrong, good  or bad, ultimately tenable  or not,30 this le-
gal-positivist  way  of thinking  about  property  is,  by  and  large,  a
given, an  unquestioned starting point, in everyday  legal  argumen-
tation under the Taking Clause.  It means that no constitutionally
significant taking of property can occur unless some government  in
some way perpetrates a departure  from some then-existent body
of  law,  upon  which  the  complaining  party  might  appropriately
have relied  as securing to him or her some property-based  advan-
tage.  Obviously, the city by revoking  its temporary  license  to me
has  not  perpetrated  any  new legal  departure;  it merely has  exer-
cised its own  rights under  existing  law.
Now, precisely what body or bodies of law are  we talking  about
here? In everyday legal argumentation, we are talking about bodies
28.  Armstrong v. United  States, 364 U.S.  40, 49  (1960).
29.  See, e.g.,  Willow River, 324  U.S.  at 502-03.
30.  For probing critique,  see Jeremy Paul,  The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.
CAL.  L. REV.  1393  (1991).
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of property  law  maintained  by the  several  States.  The  Supreme
Court generally has said that the Federal Constitution  does not it-
self advance any particular  views, or mandate  any particular  rules
or  standards,  concerning  who  gets  title  to  which property  under
what  circumstances,  or  concerning  what precise  set  of legally  se-
cured advantages goes  along with being  granted the status of legal
owner  of one  or another  kind or  piece  of property  Rather,  it is  a
commonplace  of  Our  Federalism  that  these  matters  are  left  for
definition  by bodies of state  law that the States are  free to shape
as  they severally  choose.31
If that  is  so,  you  may  wonder  how  state  officers  or  lawmakers
ever  could  be seen to take  property  for  which the Taking Clause
commands  a  compensation  payment?  One  answer  is  that it  is  al-
ways possible for state officers,  and even state lawmakers, to act at
a given point in time so as to strip  a person  of some property-like
or property-based  advantage that the State's body of property law,
in  force at that same point in  time,  does  in  fact secure  to that
person. If the state action  is not of that kind-stripping  owners of
advantages  secured to them by state law just then in force-then,
from a legal-positivist view, it cannot count as a taking of property
This state  of the doctrine  is fraught with possible consequences
for judicial federalism. This state of the doctrine means that ques-
tions  about the  content  and meaning  of historical  state  property
law are potentially  in issue  every time someone  complains  in court
that  a state government  has violated  the Federal  Constitution  by
taking property  without paying for it. If a taking  of property can
occur  only when  a government  in  some  way perpetrates  a depar-
ture from the then-existing  body of property  law, then in order  to
tell whether  a given state  action  takes property you have to know
what the State's property law as a matter of fact is-what that law
as  a  matter  of fact  says-at  the  moment  when  the  action  com-
plained  of takes  place.
Questions  about  the  historical  content  and  meaning  of  state
property law thus may figure  in taking cases-and this means, po-
tentially,  all  such  cases-as  a  special  kind  of question  of fact.  In
the framework  of Our Federalism, questions about the content and
31.  See,  e.g.,  PruneYard  Shopping  Ctr. v. Robins,  447  U.S.  74,  81  (1980);  Board of Re-
gents v.  Roth, 408  U.S.  564,  577-78  (1972).
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meaning  of state  law normally  are perceived  as falling within  the
special domains of state courts.2  Of course, not all state judiciaries
are dominated  or  controlled  by judicial conservatives.  To the  ex-
tent that they are not,  Our Federalism's  apparent  leaning toward
strong  deference  to state judiciaries  in  taking  cases  opens  a wide
door to possible hindrance  of efforts by conservative  federal judges
to revitalize  constitutional  safeguards  for property  through  what
I've called the regulatory-taking  project.
IV
Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  situation  I  have  described
than the  case  of Lucas v.  South  Carolina Coastal Council. 3 3  In
June  of  1992,  the United  States  Supreme  Court  handed  down  a
ruling in the Lucas case.  The Court, however,  did not decide the
case  conclusively  at  that  time.  The  reasons  why  it  did  not  are
wrapped up with everything  I've said  so far.
At a time when no enacted statute of South Carolina prohibited
the building  of houses there, Mr. Lucas bought fee simple titles to
two parcels of land near the South Carolina seacoast.34  Thereafter,
the South  Carolina  legislature  enacted  a statute  banning  any sig-
nificant building construction  on land in that area.3 5  As house lots,
the parcels Lucas  bought would have  had a market value  of about
$1  million,  but  the  statutory  prohibition  made  them  close  to
worthless  on the market.36 The declared  purpose of the statute was
to  protect  South  Carolina's  ocean  beaches  and  their
dunes-valuable public resources  of the state-against erosion and
destruction  as  a  consequence  of  nearby  building  construction.
3 7
Lucas  himself agreed  (as did all the Justices  of the U.S.  Supreme
Court) that South Carolina's  goal of preventing beach  erosion fell
easily within the range  of the state's proper governmental concerns
32.  This perception prompts quite a number of rules and practices regarding jurisdiction,
abstention,  and so forth.
33.  112 S.  Ct. 2886  (1992).
34.  Id. at 2889.
35.  Id.
36.  See  id. at 2890,  2892.
37.  Id.  at 2896  &  n.10.
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and that prohibiting construction  on land in the coastal zone was a
reasonable  way of pursuing that goal. 8
What Mr. Lucas didn't see was why he rather than the taxpayers
of South Carolina should foot the bill for a  $1  million share of the
cost of securing this public benefit. He contended  that the Taking
Clause required the State to spread the burden to its taxpayers by
writing him a check to cover his $1  million market loss. Lucas was
thus  pressing against the State  what is  called  an inverse  condem-
nation  claim, for what is called  a regulatory taking. A  claim for  a
regulatory  taking is  a claim that a State has taken  property from
you,  in effect, by imposing an onerous  legal restriction  on the way
you  are  allowed  to use  some  piece  of property  to  which  you  still
hold  title.  An  inverse  condemnation  claim  is  a  claim  for  money
that the State allegedly  owes  you, by force  of constitutional  man-
date, for property that it allegedly took from you without compen-
sating you for it  as the Taking Clause commands.
Although Lucas meant his claim to be based on the Federal Con-
stitution, he filed his case in a South Carolina state trial court. Our
Federalism  left  him no  choice.  Where  state  courts  are  authorized
by state  law  (as they are  in South  Carolina) to adjudicate  inverse
condemnation  claims, the U.S. Supreme Court requires federal dis-
trict courts  to  ignore  such claims  unless and until they have  been
rejected  by the courts  of the State  concerned.3
The  South  Carolina  Supreme  Court  rejected  Lucas'  taking-of-
property  claim  as  a  matter  of  law  It  believed  that  a regulatory
restriction  of property  use cannot amount to a taking of property,
as long  as the restriction  is aptly designed  to protect a significant
public  value  against  harm  or  destruction.40  The  U.S.  Supreme
Court  disagreed.  In  an  opinion  by  Justice  Scalia,  the  Court
held-subject  to an  important proviso-that  a  State's  regulatory
38.  See zd.  at 2896-97.
39.  The rough idea is that until that has happened,  it cannot yet be clear that "the State"
has  committed  the  constitutional  impropriety  consisting  of an  uncompensated taking  of
property. See  Williamson  County  Regional Planning Comm'n  v. Hamilton  Bank,  473  U.S.
172,  195 (1985)  (holding that a constitutional  claim for uncompensated  deprivation of prop-
erty does  not ripen until the property  owner  has pursued without success  all avenues pro-
vided by the State to obtain  compensation).
40. Lucas v. South Carolina  Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d  895, 899 (S.C. 1991),  rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2886  (1992).
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restriction  of land use can be a taking of property in the constitu-
tional  sense,  and  it  is  (generally  speaking)  a taking  when  it  de-
prives an owner  of a land parcel  of all economically  beneficial  use
of the parcel.4'
Under Justice Scalia's reasoning, a State cannot avoid this result
just by showing that it has a very strong reason of public policy for
imposing the restriction.  Why,  after all,  should that matter9  The
direct effect of saying that property has been taken from Lucas is
not to bar  South Carolina  from  carrying out  its program  of land
use restriction in aid of its policy of dune preservation.  The direct
effect is  only to require the State to spread to all of its taxpayers
the million  dollar loss to the value  of Lucas'  land,  occasioned  by
the State's choice of this particular means of securing a public ben-
efit. What could be  fairer9
Well, nothing  as long as you are fully satisfied that Lucas is
truly  suffering  a property  loss  in  this  case.  But  is  he not clearly
suffering  such  a loss,  given  the  stipulated  facts that his  land  se-
curely free of the building restriction  is worth a million dollars  on
the market  and with the restriction  in  force  is worth  hardly any-
thing9  The answer to that is: It's not so clear. You have to keep in
mind the legal-positivist view of property  According to that view,
a new South Carolina statute that forecloses Lucas'  opportunity to
build houses on his land might very well not affect his property  In
order to make  that determination,  we  need to know  a fact about
South Carolina property law as it stood just prior to the enactment
of the statute.
Justice  Scalia and his Court fully  understood this point. I have
already mentioned that the Court's holding was  made subject to a
proviso.  Now let us examine  the proviso. In  its broadest  formula-
tion, it  is this: A State's regulatory restriction of land use, even  one
that obliterates  the economic  value  of a parcel  of land to its cur-
rent  owner,  cannot  count  as  a  taking  of property  if exposure  to
restriction  of that kind already  "inhere[s]  in  the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nui-
sance  place upon land ownership."4 In such a case, liability to
41.  Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2893-95.
42.  Id.  at 2900.
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restriction always already encumbers every land title claiming legal
recognition under that same  body of law.
Having gone that far, Justice Scalia and his Court then shunted
Lucas'  case back to the South Carolina Supreme Court for a deter-
mination of what we can now see is a crucial factual question about
the content and meaning of historical South Carolina property law-
Did  that  law,  or  did  it  not,  contain  a  norm-a  rule  or  princi-
ple-whose  effect  is to deny to owners  of land  (situated  as Lucas'
was)  a secure  freedom to build  (as Lucas  proposed to build)9
Justice Scalia's  opinion made  plain, however, that his Court did
not  intend  for the state  court's  determination  of that question to
be final.  Rather,  it  would  be subject to the  U.S. Supreme  Court's
own subsequent examination  of the determination's "objective  rea-
sonableness"  as  an  application  of  "relevant"  state-law
"precedents."4
V
Imagine that the South Carolina  court  on remand  of the Lucas
case decides against Lucas and hands down the following opinion:'
As  we understand  the United  States  Supreme  Court,  we are
now asked to decide whether the annals of South Carolina prop-
erty law contain material fairly prefiguring the potential liability
of land like  Lucas'  to  be  subjected  to the kind of statutory  re-
striction  on use that Lucas says  took property from  him. If the
answer  is  yes, then potential  liability to  such  a  restriction  was
already  inherent  in  Lucas'  legal  property  title  at the  moment
when he  acquired it, so  that actual  statutory  enactment  of the
restriction  did  not  take  from  Lucas  any  property  entitlement
that he  ever truly had.
43.  Id.  at 2902  n.18.
44.  In fact,  the South  Carolina  court on remand  responded  in  a quite  different  manner
from what my text imagines. Construing the U.S. Supreme Court's Lucas opinion as putting
to it a question of whether the state's Coastal  Council "possesses the ability under the com-
mon law to prohibit Lucas from  constructing  a habitable  structure on his  land,"  the court
said that its "research  [has not] uncovered  any such common law principle" and  accordingly
decided this phase of the case  in Lucas'  favor.  Lucas v. South Carolina  Coastal Council, 424
S.E.2d 484,  486 (S.C.  1992). We shall see below what may have led the South Carolina court
to take such a  narrow view  of the opening  left it  by Justice  Scalia's opinion for  a possible
decision  in favor  of the State.
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The issue before us is deeply layered. The deepest layer seems
to us to be this:  In order to say precisely what consequences  are
fairly  prefigured  by  an  "objectively  reasonable"  reading  of  a
body of legal material,  a  corpus juris, you have to posit  some-
thing  about the jurisprudential  spirit  or interpretative  attitude
with which the material  is  conventionally  approached  and con-
sulted. We  can imagine a legal culture-a "law-of-rules"  culture,
let  us  call  it-in  which  refusing  compensation  to  Lucas  now
would be  unreasonable,  outrageous,  a  repudiation  of what Jus-
tice Scalia calls the "historical  compact" promising a decent  re-
gard for the institution  of private property.45  The  clearest  case
of such a legal culture would be one that is both strongly liberta-
rian and strongly formalist. The twin premises  of such a culture
would be these: First, the default position, in the absence of ex-
press positive law to the contrary, would be absolute freedom  on
the part of property owners to use their property as they choose.
Second, nothing would count as express positive law to the con-
trary unless it took the form of a specific, virtually self-applying
rule-statement, something  like "building houses  in dunelands  is
forbidden."  More  spacious  principles of right and wrong, whose
applications to specific cases require exercises of judgments hav-
ing more contestable  outcomes, would not in such a law-of-rules
jurisprudence  count  as law at all.
What we  have just described  is a  possible legal  culture. It  is
not, however, the legal  culture  of South  Carolina. South  Caro-
lina  is  a common-law  jurisdiction. To  common  lawyers,  asking
whether  a  given  consequence  "inheres  in"  the  main body  of  a
State's law  is  the  same  as  asking whether  that  consequence  is
fairly prefigured  by a prudent extrapolation  of the precedential
trajectories that are fairly  legible in the material. To put it  an-
other way: Law, for us, is an adaptive body of general principles,
not a frozen list of sharply specific rules and rulings. Citizenship
here  encompasses  responsibility  for  constantly  adjusting  one's
actions  and  expectations  to  that  evolving  body  of  principles,
among which-we  need hardly point out-are principles of def-
erence  by all  to  common  needs  and  interests  of the people  of
South Carolina that from time to time gain wide recognition  as
important.
Salient  among  our  law's long-entrenched  principles  of  prop-
erty law is that owners of property shall refrain from using what
45.  Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2899-2900.
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they  own  in  ways  that  unreasonably  impair  other  peo-
ple's-including  the public's-use  and  enjoyment  of what they
own.  Another  long  established  principle  here  is that  the  ocean
beaches  and  dunelands  are  a public  trust  for all the  people  of
this State. It  is true that in the past, and indeed  until quite re-
cently,  owners  of duneland  property  have  in  practice  been  al-
lowed the freedom  of putting houses there. It  is true that prior
to the statute  of which Lucas  complains  no South Carolina law
or  decision  had  ever  declared  that building  houses  on  or near
dunelands  went beyond  the normal liberties  of a landowner.  It
is,  however,  equally  true  that no  law  or  decision  had  ever  de-
clared  irrevocable  the freedom  of house-building  in the dunes.
Our law makes allowance for the fact that what appears to one
age  to  be  innocent  use  of  one's  own  property  may  sometimes
justifiably come to appear to a successor  age to be an unreasona-
ble encroachment  on the property-based interests of others or of
the public at large. As Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion in this
very  case,  the  law  of  nuisance  contains  the  principle  that
"changed  circumstances  or new knowledge  may make what was
previously  permissible no longer so."' 46  This capacity of the  com-
mon law-the "background"  law-to extend itself to new condi-
tions  is today,  and has long  been understood  to  be, an integral
part  of this  State's  background  principles  of property  law.  As
such it enters into and inheres in all property titles claiming  rec-
ognition under  our law, including the titles acquired  by Mr. Lu-
cas. Case  dismissed.
For convenience,  I'm going to call the sort of response to Lucas'
claim  that  I've  just  sketched  a  "jurisprudence  of  principles  re-
sponse. ' 4 7  There  are  clear  signs  in  Justice  Scalia's  Lucas  opin-
46.  Id.  at 2901.
47.  There  is  also  a  more  radically  revisionist  way  of  understanding  the  mock  opin-
ion-one that, with a cue from  Margaret Jane Radin, we  may  call a  "jurisprudence of cul-
ture" response:
[T]he  existence  of property  regimes,  their  phenomenological  detail,  is  con-
nected  with  culture  and  not  just  with  government  action  narrowly  con-
ceived.  [Olur very recognition of the existence  of property rights is  inter-
twined  with  our  perceptions  of their  justice.  There  is no  sharp  demarcation
between  empirical and normative  questions, and cultural commitments  are re-
flected  in the way we  view  either kind  of question.
.[G]overnment and  culture are  not separate.  Legal  regimes  both  express
and help to shape culture, and in that function  they have symbolic force
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ion-signs that I will describe specifically later on-that he and his
Court do not intend to let States use this sort of response as a way
of defeating  claims  that  highly  onerous  restrictions  of  land  use
amount to  compensable  takings  of property  It  is  not difficult  to
think of possible  reasons  why they  would  not. Judicial  conserva-
tives, to repeat, do not control  the judiciaries  in  all of the States,
perhaps  not in  most  of them.  It  could  well  be  that a  significant
number of state judiciaries,  dealing with regulatory  taking claims
in  the  aftermath  of the  Lucas  decision,  honestly  will  see  their
States'  background laws of property  and nuisance  in the light of a
jurisprudence  of adaptive and evolving principles  including expan-
sive  principles  of public  trust and  social  responsibility,  much  as
does  my  imagined  South  Carolina  court.  Some  state  judiciaries
may be spurred to such a view by political outlooks that are hostile
to beefed-up constitutional protection for property, or they may be
spurred just by desires to help minimize their States'  exposures to
regulatory-takings  liabilities.
If the jurisprudence-of-principles  response  is,  in  principle,  al-
lowed to defeat a regulatory-taking  claim, then the regulatory-tak-
ing project-the Lucas Court's  apparent drive  to put some muscle
back into constitutional protection for property  against costly reg-
ulation-is at the mercy of state judiciaries. The reason is that the
jurisprudence-of-principles  response,  if  allowed  at  all,  seems
deployable  by  any moderately  capable  state  judge  to justify  un-
compensated  imposition of any state  regulatory restriction  of land
.The culture  of private property  in  some  states  [seems]  to be
evolving  toward  an  understanding  that  beaches  are  a  special  resource  not
treated the same as ordinary objects of property. The legal system influence[s]
this  cultural  evolution,  but  the -ultural  evolution  also  influence[s]  the legal
system. The understanding seem[s] to be that both free public access to enjoy-
ment of the resource, and  conservation of the resource for future public  enjoy-
ment,  [are]  important enough  to attenuate,  as a matter  of natural  right, the
possibilities  for full private ownership  of beach property. The cultural  under-
standing seem[s]  to be that the stereotyped private property  regime,  with its
broad  discretion  of owners to  control  use and  exclusion  [is],  with respect  to
this particular  resource, wrong.
Margaret Jane Radin, Government Interests and Takings: Cultural Commitments of Prop-
erty and the Role of Political Theory, in  COMPELLING  GOVERNMENT  INTERESTS:  THE  Mys-
TERY  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  ANALYSIS  (Stephen  E.  Gottlieb  ed.,  forthcoming)  (manuscript at
241-44,  on file with  the William and Mary Law Review).
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use that passes the basic  due process  test of rational relation to  a
legitimate  state goal-no  matter how confiscatory  the regulation's
impact and no matter how sharply deviant from past practice some
may find  it.
48
One  can see, then, how embrace  of the regulatory-taking  project
might dispose the Lucas Court to want to resist the jurisprudence-
of-principles  response. More  difficult to see is how the Court possi-
bly  can  resist  it,  without  making  hash  of another  stance  toward
state law and state adjudication that judicial conservatives  profess
to  cherish.  Of  course  I  mean  the  stance  affectionately  known  as
Our  Federalism.
VI
Picture the U.S.  Supreme  Court rejecting the jurisprudence-of-
principles  response  to the Lucas remand that I imaginatively  put
together  for the South Carolina  court. The  insult to Our  Federal-
ism  would  seem massive.  The  matter  at issue  is  the  content  and
meaning  of "background  principles"  of South  Carolina law. The
question  is  what  restrictions  on  land  use  are  and  are  not  fairly
prefigured in,  or conscientiously inferable from, that State's corpus
juris.  How  can  the  Federal  Supreme  Court  credibly  purport  to
know better  in this matter  than the state supreme  court?  What I
have  called  a jurisprudence-of-principles  response  by  a  state  su-
preme  court would  almost certainly not be facially  implausible. If
any  sort of question  seems to demand  deference  to a state judici-
ary,  this  question  of the  prevailing  "jurisprudential  spirit"  in  a
State  looks like  it.
49
We now have before us what seems like an impasse between two
apparent projects of contemporary judicial conservatives,  the regu-
latory-taking  project  and  Our  Federalism.  Next,  let  us  consider
some  possible  escapes.
48.  See John A.  Humbach, Evolving  Threshholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause,
18  COLUM.  J.  ENV. L.  1,  7  (1993)  ("In essence,  the law of  nuisance provides  a  common law
immunity from  takings  challenges.").
49.  See, e.g., LeBel,  supra note 9,  at 1038  (noting the state  court's presumptive  superior
knowledge  of the  particular  state's  "decisional  milieu,"  meaning  "the  total  environment
within which law is crafted-a complex set of specific factors  that affect the content of legal
rules").
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There  may  be  fifty  States,  but  does  it  necessarily  follow  that
there  are  in America  fifty  different  bodies  of general  background
principles  of property  and nuisance  law 9  Why couldn't it  be  that
there  is  only  one  such body,  in  which  all the  States participate?
Why couldn't it  be that the  one  body of background  law is  a uni-
form national possession? If it were, then federal judges  could an-
swer  for  its content and  meaning  directly,  with no need at all  to
take instruction from state judges."
Passages  in Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion suggest that he might
have just such a notion somewhere in mind. He writes in places as
if there  is just one  American background law of property and nui-
sance-supportive,  as it happens,  of Lucas' claim-that is common
to the national jurisdiction and all the state jurisdictions. "It  seems
unlikely,"  opines  the Justice,  "that common-law  principles  would
have  prevented  the  erection  of  any  habitable  or  productive  im-
provements  on petitioner's land; they rarely support prohibition of
the 'essential use'  of land."'
1  Could Justice Scalia here be intimat-
ing a unified  or standard American  "background"  law that he re-
gards as  eo ipso the law  of South Carolina?
It  seems  that Justice  Scalia could not have  meant exactly  that,
unless  perchance  he  is  the  ghost  incarnate  of  Swift  v.  Tyson.52
Swift,  you  will  recall,  is the  case that  stood  for  the notion  of  a
"federal  general  common  law,"  repudiated  in  Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins.
5 3 As the founding document of modern American judi-
cial  federalism,  Erie  famously  explained,  on  legal-positivist
grounds, why in the American  federal system there can be no such
general background  law  of the country-
50.  On that understanding, we could explain Justice Scalia's remand of the Lucas case to
the  South  Carolina  court not as  a  quest for  facts about  South Carolina  law that are  best
known to that court, but as an act of comity meant to give the South Carolina judges a fair
crack at deciding the case under newly-minted federal constitutional doctrine. See generally
Richard  H.  Fallon, Jr. &  Daniel  J.  Meltzer, New  Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARv.  L. REV.  1733  (1991).
51.  Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2901.  It  is probably accidental  that Justice  Scalia  chose to sup-
port that proposition  by a citation to Curtin v. Benson,  222 U.S. 78  (1911),  an obscure case
involving a  challenge to a restriction imposed by the federal government  on the use of pri-
vate land under federal  jurisdiction because the land was located within the boundaries of a
national park.
52.  41 U.S.  (16  Pet.) 1  (1842),  overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304  U.S. 64  (1938).
53.  304  U.S. 64,  78  (1938).
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"  [L]aw in  the sense in which courts speak of it today does
not  exist  without some  definite  authority  behind  it. The  com-
mon law so  far as  it is enforced  in a State, whether  called com-
mon law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of
that State existing by the authority of that State without regard
to  what  it  may  have  been  in  England  or  anywhere  else.
[T]he  authority  and  only  authority  is  the  State,  and  if
that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether  it
be  of its Legislature  or  of its Supreme  Court]  should  utter the
last word." 4
It  would  be extremely  surprising if the Lucas decision  turned  out
to carry  in its innards a disguised  attack on  the premises  of Erie,
which  doesn't  seem to be the sort of decision  to be overruled  sub
silentio. If perchance  one did feel compelled to read Lucas as doing
that, then  one  certainly  would  have  confirmed  the sense  of deep
disconsonance  between  the  regulatory-taking  project  and  Our
Federalism.
But  hang  on  a  minute,  you  say  There  could  be  a  uniformly
binding  body of  American  background  property  law  about  which
federal judges  are  positioned to know  as  much or more than state
judges,  without its being  any kind  of general federal  law  It  could
be federal  constitutional law 55 Specifically,  it  could be  a body  of
norms extruded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' protec-
tions for private property-a sort of minimum content  of property
law impressed upon all the States by force of the Federal Constitu-
tion.56  Such  a  constitutionally  mandated  minimum  content  of
property law logically could contain the sub-rule that ownership  of
a parcel  of land always  includes at least the liberty of putting that
parcel to whatever  counts for it as an "essential  use,"  along with a
corollary  presumption  that  "essential  use"  includes  a  family-size
house.
54.  Id.  at 79  (quoting Black &  White Taxicab  Co. v.  Brown  & Yellow  Taxicab  Co.,  276
U.S.  518,  533-34,  535  (1928)  (Holmes,  J., dissenting)).
55.  I bypass the question of whether this would  be constitutional  "common  law"  subject
to  congressional  revision.  See Henry P  Monaghan,  The Supreme Court, 1974 Term; Fore-
word: Constitutional  Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1975)  (positing federal judicial
power  to "create  a sub-order  of 'quasi-constitutional'  law  of  a  remedial,  substantive,
and  procedural  character  to vindicate  constitutional  liberties").
56.  See, e.g.,  Richard H.  Fallon, Jr., Some  Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Re-
view,  and Constitutional  Remedies, 93 COLUM.  L. REV.  309  (1993).
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In such a view, there would be no offense to Erie. There may be,
however, other obstacles to ascribing this line of thought to Justice
Scalia. We could start by pointing to its deviation from the Court's
standard  legal-positivist  property  mantra:  Property interests  "are
not created  by the  Constitution,"  the mantra  goes.  "Rather, they
are  created  and their dimensions  are  defined  by existing rules  or
understandings  that  stem  from  an  independent  source  such  as
state law."' 5 7  To be honest, though, I don't yet see much of a prob-
lem. It could  be perfectly  reasonable to say that the Federal Con-
stitution  mandates  upon the States  a  minimum  content  of prop-
erty  law,  a common  substrate, while  all the rest of property  law,
elaborations  and  superstructures  that  give  the  law  its  concrete
shape  and  content,  are  given  by the  diverse  positive  laws  of the
several  States.
A more serious doubt is whether the stance described is available
to  Justice  Scalia,  considering  what  Our  Federalism  specifically
means to him. To speak of a "minimum  content" of property is to
flirt dangerously with a constitutional jurisprudence  of natural law
in  the  strong sense.  To  speak  of a  minimum  content  defined  in
part by intelligible essences-defined  in part by "essential  uses" of
property that are objectively  cognizable by judges-is seemingly to
close the deal, to move from flirtation  to espousal.
It is tempting to ask whether  Justice Scalia can do  this without
taking leave  of himself. If "property"  in the Fourteenth  Amend-
ment mandates  a minimum  natural-law  content, then what about
"liberty9'" If a United States Supreme Court Justice can know that
property's minimum content encompasses the privilege  of building
a house on land you own, why couldn't he by the same token know
that liberty's  minimum  content  encompasses  a  right to  see  your
natural  child  occasionally,5  or  a  right  of decision  over  how  long
your own, life,59  or your own  pregnancy,6 0  is to endure?
57.  Board  of Regents  v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,  577 (1972).  See Radin, supra note 47  (manu-
script at 246)  ("Scalia's view  [in  Lucas] tends to impose  a general  regime  (i.e.,  a federal
interpretation)  of property  and foreclose  state deviance  from it.  This view appears  in ten-
sion with the Court's  view  m an analogous  earlier  decision, PruneYard v. Robins, that re-
fused to recognize  any federal regime  of property  rights  ") (citation omitted).
58.  See  Michael H. v. Gerald D.,  491  U.S.  110  (1989)  (Scalia, J.).
59.  See  Cruzan  v.  Missouri  Dep't  of  Health,  497  U.S.  261,  292  (1990)  (Scalia,  J.,
concurring)
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We can see, I think, how Justice Scalia would respond. It seems
he would say that the constitutionally mandated minimum content
of property is drawn not from transcendent sources  ("nature") but
from  an  historically  specific,  American  "constitutional  cul-
ture"-"the  understandings  of our  citizens  regarding  the  content
of, and the State's power  over, the 'bundle  of rights'  that they ac-
quire  when  they  obtain  title  to  [land]" 61-the  contents  of which
are  accessible  by  judges  not  through  speculative  reason  but
through  objective  knowledge  of historical  social  practice. It is,  in
fact, to this kind of social history that Justice Scalia's opinions ex-
pressly  turn for  answers to  questions about  the minimum  federal
content  of "liberty ",62 Why  not likewise  for "property9"
This response passes the test of logical consistency  The question
is  how  it  could  ever  be  made  substantively  convincing.  Justice
Scalia's Lucas opinion discerns  in  the American  past  (as of some
unspecified  moment)  a  tradition  of  firm-nay,  uncondi-
tional-expectation  to  be  compensated  if  ever  the  government
should act so  as foreclose you of opportunity to build a house on a
beach lot you bought and paid for, by requiring you for the public
good to  leave  the  land  in  its "natural,"' undeveloped  state. 6 3  De-
spite awareness that "early constitutional theorists  did not believe
the Takings  Clause embraced regulations  of property at all,"'64 the
Lucas opinion's  subscribers  are  of the view-they  "think"-that
any suggestion that land titles always  come encumbered with a lia-
bility to potential state action that would totally strip the property
of "economically  valuable  use"  is precluded  by a "historical  com-
pact recorded  in the Taking Clause that has become a part of our
constitutional  culture."65
We  need to ask, in the first place,  how  or why any judge would
consider  himself licensed  for  assertion  of anything  like  objective
60.  See Planned Parenthood v.  Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873  (1992)  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61.  See Lucas  v. South  Carolina  Coastal  Council,  112 S.  Ct. 2886,  2899-2900  (1992).
62.  See Planned Parenthood v.  Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2873 (1992)  (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Cruzan  v.  Missouri  Dep't  of Health,  497  U.S.  261,  292  (1990)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring);
Michael  H.  v. Gerald D.,  491  U.S.  110  (1990).
63.  See Joseph  L. Sax, Property  Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding  Lu-
cas v. South Carolina  Coastal  Council, 45 STAN.  L. REv. 1433,  1441  (1993).
64.  Lucas, 112  S.  Ct. at 2900  n.15.
65.  Id.  at 2900.
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knowledge-safely  proof against the judge's  own "will" 66 -of  such
a free-floating  sort of historical fact. (I mean naked assertion,  too,
because the Lucas opinion refers  to no source external to its sub-
scribers for its crucial  claim  of judicial  knowledge.)  We need fur-
ther to keep  in mind  some  other pertinent  and, it  seems,  equally
plausible traditions.  One thinks of the tradition  of free public  ac-
cess to the sea and its environs, today increasingly  read by courts
all around this country as encompassing public rights of enjoyment
of the beach. 7  One  thinks of the tradition  of legally required re-
gard for other people's  interests when you make use of your prop-
erty  One thinks of the tradition of a dynamically functional law of
property, oriented  no less to contemporary community  goals than
to protection  of private  advantage. 6 8  One  thinks of the "historical
tradition  in which the common  law core  of nuisance  has been the
frequent subject of statutory additions and refinements, providing
most of our modern  law of land use.'" 9
I  say that these  traditions I've just mentioned  are  (at the very
least) components  of the same social history that contains  Justice
Scalia's  (alleged)  tradition  of respect  for  people's  (unconditional)
freedom to put houses on land they own. I won't say that my tradi-
tions  trump  his,  but  neither  will  I  grant  that  his  trump  mine.
There  they all are, and the question  is  how do they sum or  com-
bine when  it  comes to house-building  in  1990  in the South Caro-
lina  dunelands.  This  looks  like  a  hard  question.  Justice  Scalia
needs  to  explain why  he  should  consider  himself and his judicial
colleagues  any better  qualified to answer  it-any better  qualified
to resolve  for South Carolinians  this congeries  of traditions-than
nine people picked at random from the Charleston telephone book.
Were  we to hold that question  utterly unanswerable,  we  could
not read  the Lucas decision  as resting  on a  penumbra  (shall we
say')  of constitutional property law, without setting Justice Scalia
66.  See supra notes  14, 61-62  and accompanying text.
67.  See, e.g.,  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,  471 A.2d  355  (N.J.),  cert. de-
nied, 469  U.S.  821  (1984);  Radin, supra note 47.
68.  See Sax, supra note 63,  at 1446-47.
69.  Humbach, supra note 48, at 4; see Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2921  (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(speaking of the legislative branch's "traditional power to revise the law governing the rights
and uses of property").
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on  some  sort of collision  course  with himself. But  is the  question
utterly unanswerable'
VII
Perhaps  it is not. An answer  most likely would start in the un-
mistakable  constitutional  command  to protect  (some) property,  in
some way, against the lawmaking  engines of the States. Just as ju-
dicial liberals  have  held,  in effect, that the Fifth  and Fourteenth
Amendments  require  the  federal  judiciary  somehow  to  define  a
"liberty"  norm  over against the  extant  content  of state  law,  so
might judicial conservatives  make a like claim for property 7 0 Such
a claim would be most comfortably  available  to conservatives  pre-
pared to cut back  on  the legal-positivist  account  of property  and
replace  it, in whole or  in  part, with something  naturalistic.  Those
who  will  not  or  cannot  do  this  convincingly  must  still  face  the
prospect of countermanding  state judicial  renditions  of state  law,
raising the hackles of Our Federalism.
But perhaps the hackles rise too fast. Lucas might just be a case
of federal  judicial  oversight  in  the  historically  approved  mode  of
ensuring  against  circumvention  of federally  guaranteed  rights  by
opportunistic  manipulation  of state  law  by state judges.71  Notice,
however, that operations  in this  mode  are  delicate.  Unless  firmly
documentable,  charges  of  circumvention  are  maximally  insulting
and degrading to state judiciaries, hence  maximally taxing  on Our
Federalism. This delicacy plainly informs the  established standard
test for counter-evasive federal judicial reversal  of state court judg-
ments: whether the state judgment lacked a "fair"  and a "substan-
tial" basis in state law.72 And now comes the question: In the face,
say, of the sort of jurisprudence-of-principles  stance I conjured  for
an  imaginary South  Carolina  court, how could such  a charge  ever
be convincingly  sustained?73
70.  If property  and its use are subject to limitless, uncompensated "redefinition"  by state
lawmaking, Justice  Scalia  remarks, there  is danger that redefinition  will extend so  far that
"'at last private property  disappears.'"  See Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2892-93  (quoting Pennsyl-
vania  Coal  Co. v. Mahon,  260 U.S.  393,  415  (1922)  (Holmes, J.)).
71.  See supra notes  18-19  and  accompanying text.
72.  See Demorest  v. City Bank Farmers  Trust Co.,  321  U.S.  36, 42  (1944).
73.  See supra part V
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To this exigency, judicial conservatives  might conceivably  try to
respond by thrusting upon the States, pro tanto and in the Consti-
tution's name, a law-of-rules jurisprudence.  Look again at the con-
jured  opinion, 4  and  you'll  see  the  court  there  first  describing  a
"law-of-rules"  jurisprudence  that would support Lucas'  claim  and
then denying that this is the jurisprudence  of South Carolina. Re-
call the two key elements  of the rejected jurisprudence:
First, the default position, in the absence  of express positive law
to the contrary,  is  the absolute  freedom  of property  owners  to
use their property as they choose. Second, nothing counts as ex-
press positive law to the contrary unless  it takes the form  of a
specific,  virtually  self-applying  rule-statement,  something  like
"building  houses  on  dunelands  is  forbidden."  More  spacious
principles  of  right  and  wrong,  whose  applications  to  specific
cases  require  exercises  of judgment, would  not in  such  a juris-
prudence count as law.
That conforms  precisely  to the jurisprudential  stance  that Jus-
tice  Scalia  advocates  in general  for  constitutional  judges.  In  his
Holmes Lecture  on The Rule of Law as a Law  of Rules, 5  Scalia
urged that a true Rule  of Law  is, indeed, a law of rules,  meaning
rules cast in terms  so specific that their applications  to cases  are
highly determinate and predictable, as opposed to broad principles
whose concrete applications  are necessarily  often a good deal more
debatable. 6  Perhaps  it  is  by  insisting that state  judiciaries  read
their bodies of property law as "laws  of rules," as composed of nar-
row  rules  only  and  not  spacious  principles,  that  Justice  Scalia
means to protect the regulatory-taking  project from frustration by
unsympathetic  state judiciaries.
Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion contains language  pointing clearly
in this direction. The  opinion declares  very specifically that a gen-
eral  background  principle  of an  owner's  duty to  avoid  property
uses that are  excessively harmful  to interests  of others  (packaged
with the state  legislature's  recent,  reasonable  determination  that
house-building  on dunelands is thus harmful) is not enough to get
74. See supra text accompanying  notes 44-47.
75.  See  Antonm  Scalia,  The Rule  of Law as a Law of Rules, 56  U. CHI.  L. REv.  1175
(1989).
76. Id. at 1176-77.
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South Carolina off the compensation hook in Lucas'  case:  "We  em-
phasize  that to  win  its  case  South  Carolina  must  do  more  than
proffer the legislature's  declaration that the uses Lucas desires are
inconsistent  with the  public  interest,  or the  conclusory  assertion
that they  violate  a common-law  maxim  such  as  sic utere tuo  ut
alienum non laedas.
'77
In  order to  get off the  hook, the  opinion  says,  South  Carolina
will  be required-just  as if "it sought to restrain  Lucas  in  a com-
mon-law  action  for  public  nuisance"-to  "identify  background
principles of nuisance  and property  law that prohibit the uses he
now  intends  in the  circumstances  in  which  the property  is  pres-
ently  found.178  The  State must  show  that use  of the land  in the
way  ruled  out by the  new  enactment had  "always"  been  "unlaw-
ful,"  so that the new law  merely makes this lurking  illegality "ex-
plicit. 1 7 9 In other words, South Carolina  must pay if its newly en-
acted prohibition  of house-building  on Lucas'  land  "goes  beyond
what the relevant background  principles  would dictate."0
These  are  curious  formulations.  "Principles"  in  the  law  don't
typically prohibit,  dictate,  or brand  as  unlawful  specific  classes  of
actions. "That is, after all, what makes them principles rather than
rules."'  These  formulations  are  tendentious,  too:  Without expla-
nation, they nullify any principles of state law that might possibly
warrant  a more  complex  conclusion  than simple "prohibition"  or
"dictation;"  for example, a conclusion  that a freedom hitherto  en-
joyed by landowners to build houses on dunelands  has always  been
subject to revocation  by duly  authorized  lawmakers82  (not limited
to judges adjudicating nuisance claims,  perhaps not even including
them" 3 ).
77.  Lucas, 112 S.  Ct. at 2901.
78.  Id.  at 2901-02 (emphasis  added).
79.  Id.  at 2901.
80.  Id.  (emphasis added).
81.  Michael E. Wall,  (Im)possible  Justifications of Lucas 6 (Apr. 28,  1993)  (unpublished
student paper, on file  with the  William and Mary Law Review).
82.  See Humbach, supra note  48,  at  11,  16  (noting  a  distinction  between  current  legal
"toleration"  for certain  uses of land and legal  recognition  of "inviolable"  rights to continue
such uses,  and pointing out that "the fact that  activities were lawful in the past [is not
itself a]  justification  for  their continuation").
83.  See id. at 3 & passim (contending that legislative  authority to revise, supplement, and
extend  the  common  law  of nuisance  is  a "centuries-old"  understanding,  which  Lucas "re-
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We can always  fairly ask-what stops us?-whether the relevant
principles  in a state's  corpus juris  ever did secure  to landowners,
however situated, an unconditinal  freedom of house-building,  re-
gardless  of any  consequential  danger to  a widely  regarded  public
interest that might ever come to light. If the answer is no, then the
State's revocation of Lucas'  freedom to build  (when such a danger
did come to light) is  no more  a loss  of property  to him than the
city's revocation  of my temporary freedom to garden  was  a loss  of
property  to me. Justice Scalia's  formulations, couched  in terms  of
"prohibition"  and  "dictation,"  seem  carefully  devised  to head  off
any  such inquiry
We cannot tell yet just how insistent the Supreme Court will be
in this  demand  for simple, yes-no, specificity  and resolution-red
light or  green light but no yellow (or yellow  means green)-in the
preexisting  state  law  "background"  materials  upon  which  States
may rely when appraiing  claims of regulatory taking of property.
But if the demand  goes  very far  at all,  then  once  again  it  seems
deeply at odds with Our Federalism. For its consequence  is to fed-
eralize the law of land use in a peculiarly profound way  The effect
is to make the Federal Constitution, specifically the Taking Clause,
dictate  to the States the jurisprudential spirit in which their gen-
eral laws  of property  and nuisance  are to be  read  and construed,
whether  contained  m legislative  enactments  or judicial  decisions.
Such  a mandate  must in turn exert pressure on States  regarding
the form  m which those materials  had better  be written.  It  must
push the  States  toward  preferring  the form  of monadic,  specific
rules to that of complexly  interactive  open principles.84
Perhaps,  then, one  might  see  Lucas as  a  move  in  still another
conservative judicial gambit, that of using the Federal Constitution
to dictate  a legal-formalist jurisprudential  style to  States not dis-
posed on their  own to agree with Justice  Scalia that the only true
Rule  of Law  is  a law  of rules.  Of course,  Justice  Scalia's view  of
this  matter  is  very  controversial. 5  It  remains  unclear  how  Our
vises" by a "reassignment"  of authority from state and local legislatures to state and federal
judiciaries).
84.  Professor Humbach speaks of an impending "petrifaction"  of nuisance law. See id. at
13.
85.  See,  e.g.,  RONALD  DWORIUN,  LAW'S  EhPimE  (1986); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsider-
ing the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781  (1989).
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Federalism  could  accept  a  use  of  the  Constitution's  property
clauses to foist it  upon  the States.